

ER-60-6141

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT : Soviet and Satellite Emergency and Civil
Defense Planning

REFERENCE : JDM-46-60, 25 January 1960

1. In response to the referenced request, I am enclosing
answers to the questions raised [redacted]

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2. Available information does not make it possible to be
fully responsive to each of these questions. However, I
believe the enclosed will be of assistance.

C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Deputy Director

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTER) *ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED*

S E N C L O S U R E

INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING, INCLUDING CIVIL DEFENSE

(1) Civil Emergency, including Civil Defense Planning Assumptions

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The Soviet Union has undoubtedly prepared civil defense planning assumptions, in at least as much detail as those in the referenced [redacted] Reports from the USSR and some of the European Satellite countries make it clear that cities and industrial plants have been categorized by order of civil defense priority. However, the specific civil defense planning assumptions of the Soviet Bloc have not been received. With respect to the magnitude of effort, it is estimated that the USSR is currently spending approximately twice as much on the air defense mission as on the strategic attack mission.

(2) Warning System

Information from several Bloc countries on the preparations of the civil defense warning system indicates a scheme involving the following elements:

- a. A civil defense monitor in the national military air defense war room.
- b. A civil defense command communications net using both radio and reserve wire lines.
- c. Possible links between lower level military air warning installations and local civil defense headquarters.
- d. Wire line and radio links at the local (city or area) level between various civil defense headquarters, observation posts, and important industrial plants; radio links to mobile civil defense units such as fire and police.

Warning for the population in the case of air alert is to be accomplished by normal means -- whistles, sirens (reported in place in a number of cities), and "radio." There is evidence that the USSR would prefer to broadcast alerts over the wired speaker diffusion system rather than by air broadcast. The great majority of so-called "radios" in the USSR are actually wired speakers.

Civil defense literature from the USSR states that alerts are ordered by civil defense chiefs at any administrative level from republic to city. Civil defense forces (station and installations and reconnaissance units) are described as being responsible for detecting and determining the level of all types of contamination (chemical, biological, and radiological), after attack. Soviet manuals state that the explosion of an atomic weapon is to be automatically constiuted as a chemical alarm requiring the use of individual protective gear and filtered ventilation in equipped air raid shelters. Those in shelter areas are required to remain there until told to come out by civil defense authorities.

The amount of warning expected is not fully discussed. Instructions list measures for a "threatening situation" assumes twenty-four hours will be available for preparation. However, brief instructions are included for surprise attack with no warning. One 1958 civil defense manual noted that time may be very short, possibly not exceeding fifteen or twenty minutes after the "alarm signal."

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The exchange of air warnings between civil defense units of Communist countries has not been reported.

(3) Shelters

The existing Soviet "mix" of shelters, (basements, bunkers, subways and tunnels) were built over an extended period and reflect, in part, early planning against conventional weapons and also the [redacted] atomic bomb. Since 1954, the [redacted] Soviet civil defense publications evidence an [redacted] awareness of the need for special measures to counter nuclear weapons effects. Since 1956, literature has included [redacted] of shelter ventilating systems which incorporate blast traps and dust filters for protection from nuclear effects. [redacted]

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[redacted] has also increased on [redacted] underground shelters in the USSR and on basement shelters w. to increased ceiling cover. As early as 1955, a Czechoslovakian publication pointed out the advantages of basement [redacted] masonry buildings against radiation effects -- the overlying concrete floors attenuating radiation by a factor of 1,000. An awareness of the radiation danger is thus demonstrated.

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The majority of formal air raid shelters in the Soviet Union are to be of the basement type under masonry buildings, designed to be gastight and therefore affording good fall-out protection whether designed prior to 1955 or not. Resistance to blast in most basement shelters is probably low. It can be demonstrated how much basement shelter is combat-ready. In particular, it is not known how many shelters have been

fitted with ventilation equipment, which will be essential for any prolonged use.

Bloc publications report that the financing of air [redacted] shelters is included in construction costs. Built during initial construction (or expansion, in the case of some factories), the cost of shelters is reportedly charged to the building project or to the using organization or enterprise. (In the satellites, where a few landlords still exist, shelter preparation can be charged to the owner.)

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The query as to a "general shelter program" is interpreted to mean, do the Soviets intend to build formal shelter for all the urban population or even for the whole population? It is doubtful that shelter will be universally provided in urban areas. Until 1958, instructions and literature [redacted] indicated that the population would seek nearby shelter in case of attack. Those without formal shelter available were advised that, upon the declaration of a "threatening situation," they would have to prepare field-type shelters in parks, and other open areas. As designed, the latter are essentially wood-lined, earth-covered trenches.

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Since 1958 Soviet publications have indicated that some early, strategic evacuation of urban areas may take place in the USSR. This has been specified to include the removal of school children, the aged, and other non-employed persons from urban areas. A recently published, rural civil defense manual mentions that the farm areas should be prepared to receive urban evacuees.

(4) Self-help

Our knowledge of proposed remedial measures for post-attack conditions in the Soviet Bloc is limited because the available literature is tailored to what the individual citizen needs to know.

Available texts stress individual civil defense training and the organization of "self-defense" groups. Universal civil defense instruction has been programmed since 1955. Subjects covered include (a) weapons knowledge (including atomic, biological and chemical), (b) use of gas masks, (c) use of air raid shelters, (d) fire-fighting, (e) rules for behavior during alerts, (f) first-aid, and (g) decontamination. Testing and practical exercises are being [redacted] programmed courses of instruction.

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Dwelling areas, farms, and small enterprises are supposed to have "self-defense" groups of forty-four persons for about

every five hundred inhabitants. Units within the self-defense group include those for order, fire-fighting, first aid, chemical defense, shelter, and for damage and [REDACTED]. Some specialized training of these groups is published in Soviet civil defense literature.

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Factory units of civil defense are among the better trained in the USSR and in the principal satellites. These units include the factory guards, fire departments, medical and service personnel, with worker auxiliaries. Some factory units have been reported exercising for several years and have been given approving publicity in the specialized press which follows civil defense matters.

Evidence from the satellites (Poland and Hungary) indicates that special civil defense "battalions" are being prepared as trained reserves. It is considered probable that similar units are being prepared in the USSR.

Soviet literature stresses the development of self-help capabilities at the lowest possible level. We have no solid information on the strength of the civil defense services. Soviet manuals state that all able-bodied citizens are obligated to assist in post-attack civil defense operations.

(5) Training

The Sovietao countries have a variety of civil defense [REDACTED]. A national civil defense school is maintained in Leningrad for training full-time staff officers. Satellite civil defense officials have attended courses in the Leningrad school for as long as a year.

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Scattered information indicates short courses at varying locations for city and plant officials, and for unit leaders.

Numerous air defense schools (PVO) are identified in the press. These have the primary mission of preparing [REDACTED] for the training of the general population.

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No estimate has been made as to the numbers trained in specialized schools. The full-time Soviet officer corps of civil defense (numbering about 10,000) has had [REDACTED] or staff training or both.

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(6) Control of the Population

Under civil defense conditions, the control of the [REDACTED] population during attack conditions would rest primarily with [REDACTED]

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the police. The uniformed police are the nucleus of the order "service" for civil defense. Auxiliary personnel are available from the members of the various workers' militia groups and from the voluntary paramilitary [redacted], one of which, exists in each Soviet Bloc country. These paramilitary societies are responsible for the civil [redacted] training of the general population.

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No directives are known which detail the operation of control measures. Numerous manuals are available which enjoin the population to obey the instructions of civil defense officials.

Regarding the question of how long the Soviets expect people to remain in shelter after attack, this can only be inferred. Published instructions anticipate the general population will carry food and water to the shelter. They are told not to leave shelter after attack until ordered to do so. Some factory and special purpose shelters are occasionally reported to be stocked with food for a week.

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